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Abstract
We study the problem of attacking a machine learning model in the hard-label black-box setting, where no model
information is revealed except that the attacker can make queries to probe the corresponding hard-label decisions. This
is a very challenging problem since the direct extension of state-of-the-art white-box attacks (e.g., C&W or PGD) to the
hard-label black-box setting will require minimizing a non-continuous step function, which is combinatorial and cannot
be solved by a gradient-based optimizer. The only current approach is based on random walk on the boundary [1],
which requires lots of queries and lacks convergence guarantees. We propose a novel way to formulate the hard-label
black-box attack as a real-valued optimization problem which is usually continuous and can be solved by any zeroth
order optimization algorithm. For example, using the Randomized Gradient-Free method [2], we are able to bound the
number of iterations needed for our algorithm to achieve stationary points. We demonstrate that our proposed method
outperforms the previous random walk approach to attacking convolutional neural networks on MNIST, CIFAR, and
ImageNet datasets. More interestingly, we show that the proposed algorithm can also be used to attack other discrete
and non-continuous machine learning models, such as Gradient Boosting Decision Trees (GBDT).
1 Introduction
It has been observed recently that machine learning algorithms, especially deep neural networks, are vulnerable to
adversarial examples [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8]. For example, in image classification problems, attack algorithms [9, 3, 10] can
find adversarial examples for almost every image with very small human-imperceptible perturbation. The problem of
finding an adversarial example can be posed as solving an optimization problem—within a small neighbourhood around
the original example, find a point to optimize the cost function measuring the “successfulness” of an attack. Solving this
objective function with gradient-based optimizer leads to state-of-the-art attacks [9, 3, 10, 4, 11].
Most current attacks [3, 9, 4, 12] consider the “white-box” setting, where the machine learning model is fully
exposed to the attacker. In this setting, the gradient of the above-mentioned attack objective function can be computed
by back-propagation, so attacks can be done very easily. This white-box setting is clearly unrealistic when the model
parameters are unknown to an attacker. Instead, several recent works consider the “score-based black-box” setting, where
the machine learning model is unknown to the attacker, but it is possible to make queries to obtain the corresponding
probability outputs of the model [10, 13]. However, in many cases real-world models will not provide probability
outputs to users. Instead, only the final decision (e.g., top-1 predicted class) can be observed. It is therefore interesting
to show whether machine learning model is vulnerable in this setting.
Furthermore, existing gradient-based attacks cannot be applied to some non-continuous machine learning models
which involve discrete decisions. For example, the robustness of decision-tree based models (random forest and gradient
boosting decision trees (GBDT)) cannot be evaluated using gradient-based approaches, since the gradient of these
functions does not exist.
In this paper, we develop an optimization-based framework for attacking machine learning models in a more realistic
and general “hard-label black-box” setting. We assume that the model is not revealed and the attacker can only make
queries to get the corresponding hard-label decision instead of the probability outputs (also known as soft labels).
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Attacking in this setting is very challenging and almost all the previous attacks fail due to the following two reasons.
First, the gradient cannot be computed directly by backpropagation, and finite differences based approaches also fail
because the hard-label output is insensitive to small input perturbations; second, since only hard-label decision is
observed, the attack objective functions become discontinuous with discrete outputs, which is combinatorial in nature
and hard to optimize (see Section 2.4 for more details).
In this paper, we make hard-label black-box attacks possible and query-efficient by reformulating the attack as a
novel real-valued optimization problem, which is usually continuous and much easier to solve. Although the objective
function of this reformulation cannot be written in an analytical form, we show how to use model queries to evaluate its
function value and apply any zeroth order optimization algorithm to solve it. Furthermore, we prove that by carefully
controlling the numerical accuracy of function evaluations, a Random Gradient-Free (RGF) method can convergence to
stationary points as long as the boundary is smooth. We note that this is the first attack with a guaranteed convergence
rate in the hard-label black-box setting. In the experiments, we show our algorithm can be successfully used to attack
hard-label black-box CNN models on MNIST, CIFAR, and ImageNet with far less number of queries compared to the
state-of-art algorithm.
Moreover, since our algorithm does not depend on the gradient of the classifier, we can apply our approach to other
non-differentiable classifiers besides neural networks. We show an interesting application in attacking Gradient Boosting
Decision Tree, which cannot be attacked by all the existing gradient-based methods even in the white-box setting. Our
method can successfully find adversarial examples with imperceptible perturbations for a GBDT within 30,000 queries.
2 Background and Related work
We will first introduce our problem setting and give a brief literature review to hightlight the difficulty of attacking
hard-label black-box models.
2.1 Problem Setting
For simplicity, we consider attacking a K-way multi-class classification model in this paper. Given the classification
model f : Rd → {1, . . . ,K} and an original example x0, the goal is to generate an adversarial example x such that
x is close to x0 and f(x) 6= f(x0) (x is misclassified by model f .) (1)
2.2 White-box attacks
Most attack algorithms in the literature consider the white-box setting, where the classifier f is exposed to the attacker.
For neural networks, under this assumption, back-propagation can be conducted on the target model because both
network structure and weights are known by the attacker. For classification models in neural networks, it is usually
assumed that f(x) = argmaxi(Z(x)i), where Z(x) ∈ RK is the final (logit) layer output, and Z(x)i is the prediction
score for the i-th class. The objectives in (1) can then be naturally formulated as the following optimization problem:
argmin
x
{Dis(x,x0) + cL (Z(x))} := h(x), (2)
where Dis(·, ·) is some distance measurement (e.g., `2, `1 or `∞ norm in Euclidean space), L (·) is the loss function
corresponding to the goal of the attack, and c is a balancing parameter. For untargeted attack, where the goal is to make
the target classifier misclassify, the loss function can be defined as
L (Z(x)) = max{[Z(x)]y0 −max
i6=y0
[Z(x)]i,−κ}, (3)
where y0 is the original label predicted by the classifier. For targeted attack, where the goal is to turn it into a specific
target class t, the loss function can also be defined accordingly.
Therefore, attacking a machine learning model can be posed as solving this optimization problem [9, 12], which is
also known as the C&W attack or the EAD attack depending on the choice of the distance measurement. To solve (2),
one can apply any gradient-based optimization algorithm such as SGD or Adam, since the gradient ofL (Z(x)) can be
computed via back-propagation.
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The ability of computing gradient also enables many different attacks in the white-box setting. For example,
eq (2) can also be turned into a constrained optimization problem, which can then be solved by projected gradient
descent (PGD) [11]. FGSM [3] is the special case of one step PGD with `∞ norm distance. Other algorithms such as
Deepfool [6] also solve similar optimization problems to construct adversarial examples.
2.3 Previous work on black-box attack
In real-world systems, usually the underlying machine learning model will not be revealed and thus white-box attacks
cannot be applied. This motivates the study of attacking machine learning models in the black-box setting, where
attackers do not have any information about the function f . And the only valid operation is to make queries to the model
and get the corresponding output f(x). The first approach for black-box attack is using transfer attack [14]—instead
of attacking the original model f , attackers try to construct a substitute model fˆ to mimic f and then attack fˆ using
white-box attack methods. This approach has been well studied and analyzed in [15]. However, recent papers have
shown that attacking the substitute model usually leads to much larger distortion and low success rate [10]. Therefore,
instead, [10] considers the score-based black-box setting, where attackers can use x to query the softmax layer output
in addition to the final classification result. In this case, they can reconstruct the loss function (3) and evaluate it as
long as the objective function h(x) exists for any x. Thus a zeroth order optimization approach can be directly applied
to minimize h(x). [16] further improves the query complexity of [10] by introducing two novel building blocks: (i)
an adaptive random gradient estimation algorithm that balances query counts and distortion, and (ii) a well-trained
autoencoder that achieves attack acceleration. [13] also solves a score-based attack problem using an evolutionary
algorithm and it shows their method could be applied to hard-label black-box setting as well.
2.4 Difficulty of hard-label black-box attacks
Throughout this paper, the hard-label black-box setting refers to cases where real-world ML systems only provide limited
prediction results of an input query. Specifically, only the final decision (top-1 predicted label) instead of probability
outputs is known to an attacker.
Attacking in this setting is very challenging. In Figure 1a, we show a simple 3-layer neural network’s decision
boundary. Note that the L (Z(x)) term is continuous as in Figure 1b because the logit layer output is real-valued
functions. However, in the hard-label black-box setting, only f(·) is available instead of Z(·). Since f(·) can only be
one-hot vector, if we plug-in f into the loss function,L (f(x)) (as shown in Figure 1c) will be discontinuous and with
discrete outputs.
(a) Decision boundary of
f(x)
(b)L (Z(x)) (c)L (f(x)) (d) g(θ)
Figure 1: (a) A neural network classifier. (b) illustrates the loss function of C&W attack, which is continuous and hence
can be easily optimized. (c) is the C&W loss function in the hard-label setting, which is discrete and discontinuous. (d)
our proposed attack objective g(θ) for this problem, which is continuous and easier to optimize. See detailed discussions
in Section 3.
Optimizing this function will require combinatorial optimization or search algorithms, which is almost impossible
to do given high dimensionality of the problem. Therefore, almost no algorithm can successfully conduct hard-label
black-box attack in the literature. The only current approach [1] is based on random-walk on the boundary. Although this
decision-based attack can find adversarial examples with comparable distortion with white-box attacks, it suffers from
3
exponential search time, resulting in lots of queries, and lacks convergence guarantees. We show that our optimization-
based algorithm can significantly reduce the number of queries compared with decision-based attack, and has guaranteed
convergence in the number of iterations (queries).
3 Algorithms
Now we will introduce a novel way to re-formulate hard-label black-box attack as another optimization problem, show
how to evaluate the function value using hard-label queries, and then apply a zeroth order optimization algorithm to
solve it.
3.1 A Boundary-based Re-formulation
For a given example x0, true label y0 and the hard-label black-box function f : Rd → {1, . . . ,K}, we define our
objective function g : Rd → R depending on the type of attack:
Untargeted attack: g(θ) = argminλ>0
(
f(x0 + λ
θ
‖θ‖ ) 6= y0
)
(4)
Targeted attack (given target t): g(θ) = argminλ>0
(
f(x0 + λ
θ
‖θ‖ ) = t
)
. (5)
In this formulation, θ represents the search direction and g(θ) is the distance from x0 to the nearest adversarial
example along the direction θ. The difference between (4) and (5) corresponds to the different definitions of “success-
fulness” in untargeted and targeted attack, where the former one aims to turn the prediction into any incorrect label and
the later one aims to turn the prediction into the target label. For untargeted attack, g(θ) also corresponds to the distance
to the decision boundary along the direction θ. In image problems the input domain of f is bounded, so we will add
corresponding upper/lower bounds in the definition of (4) and (5).
Figure 2: Illustration
Instead of searching for an adversarial example, we search the direction θ to
minimize the distortion g(θ), which leads to the following optimization problem:
min
θ
g(θ). (6)
Finally, the adversarial example can be found by x∗ = x0 + g(θ∗) θ
∗
‖θ∗‖ , where
θ∗ is the optimal solution of (6).
Note that unlike the C&W or PGD objective functions, which are discontin-
uous step functions in the hard-label setting (see Section 2), g(θ) maps input
direction to real-valued output (distance to decision boundary), which is usually
continuous—a small change of θ usually leads to a small change of g(θ), as can
be seen from Figure 2.
Moreover, we give three examples of f(x) defined in two dimension input
space and their corresponding g(θ). In Figure 3a, we have a continuous classification function defined as follows
f(x) =
{
1, if ‖x‖2 ≥ 0.4
0, otherwise.
In this case, as shown in Figure 3c, g(θ) is continuous. Moreover, in Figure 3b and Figure 1a, we show decision
boundaries generated by GBDT and neural network classifier, which are not continuous. However, as showed in Figure
3d and Figure 1d, even if the classifier function is not continuous, g(θ) is still continuous. This makes it easy to apply
zeroth order method to solve (6).
Compute g(θ) up to certain accuracy. We are not able to evaluate the gradient of g, but we can evaluate the
function value of g using the hard-label queries to the original function f . For simplicity, we focus on untargeted attack
here, but the same procedure can be applied to targeted attack as well.
First, we discuss how to compute g(θ) directly without additional information. This is used in the initialization step
of our algorithm. For a given normalized θ, we do a fine-grained search and then a binary search. In fine-grained search,
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(a) Decision boundary of con-
tinuous function
(b) Decision boundary of
GBDT
(c) g(θ) of (a) (d) g(θ) of (b)
Figure 3: Examples of decision boundary of classification function f(x) and corresponding g(θ)
we query the points {x0 + αθ,x0 + 2αθ, . . . } one by one until we find f(x+ iαθ) 6= y0. This means the boundary
goes between [x0 + (i − 1)αθ,x0 + iαθ]. We then enter the second phase and conduct a binary search to find the
solution within this region (same with line 11–17 in Algorithm 1). Note that there is an upper bound of the first stage if
we choose θ by the direction of x−x0 with some x from another class. This procedure is used to find the initial θ0 and
corresponding g(θ0) in our optimization algorithm. We omit the detailed algorithm for this part since it is similar to
Algorithm 1.
Next, we discuss how to compute g(θ) when we know the solution is very close to a value v. This is used in all the
function evaluations in our optimization algorithm, since the current solution is usually close to the previous solution,
and when we estimate the gradient using (7), the queried direction will only be a small perturbation of the previous one.
In this case, we first increase or decrease v in local region to find the interval that contains boundary (e.g, f(v) = y0 and
f(v′) 6= y0), then conduct a binary search to find the final value of g. Our procedure for computing g value is presented
in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Compute g(θ) locally
1: Input: Hard-label model f , original image x0, query direction θ, previous value v, increase/decrease ratio
α = 0.01, stopping tolerance  (maximum tolerance of computed error)
2: θ ← θ/‖θ‖
3: if f(x0 + vθ) = y0 then
4: vleft ← v, vright ← (1 + α)v
5: while f(x0 + vrightθ) = y0 do
6: vright ← (1 + α)vright
7: else
8: vright ← v, vleft ← (1− α)v
9: while f(x0 + vleftθ) 6= y0 do
10: vleft ← (1− α)vleft
11: ## Binary Search within [vleft, vright]
12: while vright − vleft >  do
13: vmid ← (vright + vleft)/2
14: if f(x0 + vmidθ) = y0 then
15: vleft ← vmid
16: else
17: vright ← vmid
18: return vright
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3.2 Zeroth Order Optimization
To solve the optimization problem (1) for which we can only evaluate function value instead of gradient, zeroth order
optimization algorithms can be naturally applied. In fact, after the reformulation, the problem can be potentially solved
by any zeroth order optimization algorithm, like zeroth order gradient descent or coordinate descent (see [17] for a
comprehensive survey).
Here we propose to solve (1) using Randomized Gradient-Free (RGF) method proposed in [2, 18]. In practice we
found it outperforms zeroth-order coordinate descent. In each iteration, the gradient is estimated by
gˆ =
g(θ + βu)− g(θ)
β
· u (7)
where u is a random Gaussian vector, and β > 0 is a smoothing parameter (we set β = 0.005 in all our experiments).
The solution is then updated by θ ← θ − ηgˆ with a step size η. The procedure is summarized in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 RGF for hard-label black-box attack
1: Input: Hard-label model f , original image x0, initial θ0.
2: for t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , T do
3: Randomly choose ut from a zero-mean Gaussian distribution
4: Evaluate g(θt) and g(θt + βu) using Algorithm 1
5: Compute gˆ =
g(θt + βu)− g(θt)
β
· u
6: Update θt+1 = θt − ηtgˆ
7: return x0 + g(θT )θT
There are several implementation details when we apply this algorithm. First, for high-dimensional problems, we
found the estimation in (7) is very noisy. Therefore, instead of using one vector, we sample q vectors from Gaussian
distribution and average their estimators to get gˆ. We set q = 20 in all the experiments. The convergence proofs can be
naturally extended to this case. Second, instead of using a fixed step size (suggested in theory), we use a backtracking
line-search approach to find step size at each step. This leads to additional query counts, but makes the algorithm more
stable and eliminates the need to hand-tuning the step size.
3.3 Theoretical Analysis
If g(θ) can be computed exactly, it has been proved in [2] that RGF in Algorithm 2 requires at most O( dδ2 ) iterations
to converge to a point with ‖∇g(θ)‖2 ≤ δ2. However, in our algorithm the function value g(θ) cannot be computed
exactly; instead, we compute it up to -precision, and this precision can be controlled by binary threshold in Algorithm 1.
We thus extend the proof in [2] to include the case of approximate function value evaluation, as described in the following
theorem.
Theorem 1 In Algorithm 2, suppose g has Lipschitz-continuous gradient with constant L1(g). If the error of function
value evaluation is controlled by  ∼ O(βδ2) and β ≤ O( δdL1(g) ), then in order to obtain 1N+1
N∑
k=0
EUk(‖∇g(θk)‖2) ≤
δ2, the total number of iterations is at most O( dδ2 ).
Detailed proofs can be found in the appendix. Note that the binary search procedure could obtain the desired function
value precision in O(log δ) steps. By using the same idea with Theorem 1 and following the proof in [2], we could also
achieve O(d
2
δ3 ) complexity when g(θ) is non-smooth but Lipschitz continuous.
4 Experimental results
We test the performance of our hard-label black-box attack algorithm on convolutional neural network (CNN) models
and compare with decision-based attack [1]. Furthermore, we show our method can be applied to attack Gradient
Boosting Decision Tree (GBDT) and present some interesting findings.
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Table 1: Results of untargeted attack.
MNIST CIFAR10 Imagenet (ResNet-50)
Avg L2 # queries Avg L2 # queries Avg L2 # queries
Decision-attack (black-box) 1.1222 60,293 0.1575 123,879 5.9791 123,4071.1087 143,357 0.1501 220,144 3.7725 260,797
Opt-attack (black-box) 1.188 22,940 0.2050 40,941 6.9796 71,1001.049 51,683 0.1625 77,327 4.7100 127,086
1.011 126,486 0.1451 133,662 3.1120 237,342
C&W (white-box) 0.9921 - 0.1012 - 1.9365 -
4.1 Attack CNN image classification models
We use three standard datasets: MNIST [19], CIFAR-10 [20] and ImageNet-1000 [21]. To have a fair comparison with
previous work, we adopt the same networks used in both [9] and [1]. In detail, both MNIST and CIFAR use the same
network structure with four convolution layers, two max-pooling layers and two fully-connected layers. Using the
parameters provided by [9], we could achieve 99.5% accuracy on MNIST and 82.5% accuracy on CIFAR-10, which is
similar to what was reported in [9]. For Imagenet-1000, we use the pretrained network Resnet-50 [22] provided by
torchvision1, which could achieve 76.15% top-1 accuracy. All models are trained using Pytorch and our source code is
publicly available2.
We include the following algorithms into comparison:
• Opt-based black-box attack (Opt-attack): our proposed algorithm.
• Decision-based black-box attack [1] (Decision-attack): the only previous work on attacking hard-label black box
model. We use the authors’ implementation and use default parameters provided in Foolbox3.
• C&W white-box attack [9]: one of the current state-of-the-art attacking algorithm in the white-box setting. We do
binary search on parameter c per image to achieve the best performance. Attacking in the white-box setting is a
much easier problem, so we include C&W attack just for reference and indicate the best performance we can
possibly achieve.
For all the cases, we conduct adversarial attacks for randomly sampled N = 100 images from validation sets. Note
that all three attacks have 100% successful rate, and we report the average L2 distortion, defined by 1N
∑N
i=1 ‖x(i) −
x
(i)
0 ‖2, where x(i) is the adversarial example constructed by an attack algorithm and x(i)0 is the original i-th example.
For black-box attack algorithms, we also report average number of queries for comparison.
4.1.1 Untargeted Attack
Figure 4: Log distortion comparison of Decision-attack
(solid curves) vs Opt-attack (dotted curves) over number of
queries for 6 different images.
For untargeted attack, the goal is to turn a correctly classified
image into any other label. The results are presented in Table 1.
Note that for both Opt-attack and Decision-attack, by changing
stopping conditions we can get the performance with different
number of queries.
First, we compare two black-box attack methods in Table 1.
Our algorithm consistently achieves smaller distortion with
less number of queries than Decision-attack. For example, on
MNIST data, we are able to reduce the number of queries by
3-4 folds, and Decision-attack converges to worse solutions
in all the 3 datasets. Compared with C&W attack, we found
black-box attacks attain slightly worse distortion on MNIST
and CIFAR. This is reasonable because white-box attack has
much more information than black-box attack and is strictly
easier. We note that the experiments in [1] conclude that C&W
1https://github.com/pytorch/vision/tree/master/torchvision
2https://github.com/LeMinhThong/blackbox-attack
3https://github.com/bethgelab/foolbox
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(a) Examples of targeted Opt-attack
(b) Examples of targeted Decision-attack
Figure 5: Example quality comparison between targeted Opt-attack and Decision-attack. Opt-attack can achieve a better
result with less queries.
Table 2: Results of targeted attack.
MNIST CIFAR10
Avg L2 # queries Avg L2 # queries
Decision-attack (black-box)
2.3158 30,103 0.2850 55,552
2.0052 58,508 0.2213 140,572
1.8668 192,018 0.2122 316,791
Opt-attack (black-box)
1.8522 46,248 0.2758 61,869
1.7744 57,741 0.2369 141,437
1.7114 73,293 0.2300 186,753
C&W (white-box) 1.4178 - 0.1901 -
and Decision-attack have similar performance because they only run C&W with a single regularization parameter c
without doing binary search to obtain the optimal parameter. For ImageNet, since we constraint the number of queries,
the distortion of black-box attacks is much worse than C&W attack. The gap can be reduced by increasing the number
of queries as showed in Figure 4.
4.1.2 Targeted attack
The results for targeted attack is presented in Table 2. Following the experiments in [1], for each randomly sampled
image with label i we set target label t = (i+ 1) module 10. On MNIST data, we found our algorithm is more than 4
times faster (in terms of number of queries) than Decision-attack and converge to a better solution. On CIFAR data,
our algorithm has similar efficiency with Decision-attack at the first 60,000 queries, but converges to a slightly worse
solution. Also, we show a example quality comparison from the same starting point to the original sample in Figure 5.
4.1.3 Attack Gradient Boosting Decision Tree (GBDT)
To evaluate our method’s ability to attack models with discrete decision functions, we conduct our untargeted attack
on gradient booting decision tree (GBDT). In this experiment, we use two standard datasets: HIGGS [23] for binary
classification and MNIST [19] for multi-class classification. We use popular LightGBM4 framework to train the GBDT
models. Using suggested parameters5, we could achieve 0.8457 AUC for HIGGS and 98.09% accuracy for MNIST. The
results of untargeted attack on GBDT are in Table 3.
4https://github.com/Microsoft/LightGBM
5https://github.com/Koziev/MNIST Boosting
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Table 3: Results of untargeted attack on gradient boosting decision tree.
HIGGS MNIST
Avg L2 # queries Avg L2 # queries
Ours
0.3458 4,229 0.6113 5,125
0.2179 11,139 0.5576 11,858
0.1704 29,598 0.5505 32,230
As shown in Table 3, by using around 30K queries, we could get a small distortion on both datasets, which firstly
uncovers the vulnerability of GBDT models. Tree-based methods are well-known for its good interpretability. And
because of that, they are widely used in the industry. However, we show that even with good interpretability and a
similar prediction accuracy with convolution neural network, the GBDT models are vulnerable under our Opt-attack.
This result raises a question about tree-based models’ robustness, which will be an interesting direction in the future.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a generic and optimization-based hard-label black-box attack algorithm, which can be applied
to discrete and non-continuous models other than neural networks, such as the gradient boosting decision tree. Our
method enjoys query-efficiency and has a theoretical convergence guarantee on the attack performance. Moreover, our
attack achieves smaller or similar distortion using 3-4 times less queries compared with the state-of-the-art algorithm.
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6 Appendix
Because there is a stopping criterion in Algorithm 1, we couldn’t achieve the exact g(θ). Instead, we could get g˜ with 
error, i.e., g(θ)−  ≤ g˜(θ) ≤ g(θ) + . Also, we define gˆ(θ) = g˜(θ+βu)−g˜(θ)β · u to be the noisy gradient estimator.
Following [24], we define the Guassian smoothing approximation over g(θ), i.e,
gβ(θ) =
1
κ
∫
E
g(θ + βu)e−
1
2 ||u||2du. (8)
Also, we have the upper bounds for the moments Mp = 1κ
∫
E
||u||pe− 12 ||u||2du from [24] Lemma 1.
For p ∈ [0, 2], we have
Mp ≤ dp/2. (9)
If p ≥ 2, we have two-sided bounds
np/2 ≤Mp ≤ (p+ n)p/2. (10)
6.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Suppose g has a lipschitz-continuous gradient with constant L1(g), then
|g(y)− g(x)− 〈∇g(x), y − x〉| ≤ 1
2
L1(g)||x− y||2. (11)
We could bound Eu(||gˆ(θ)||2) as follows. Since
(g˜(θ + βu)2 − g˜(θ))2 = [g˜(θ + βu)− g˜(θ)− β〈∇g(θ), u〉+ β〈∇g(θ)〉]2
≤ 2(g(θ + βu)− g(θ) + θ+βu − θ)2 + 2β2〈∇g(θ), u〉2
(12)
and |θ+βu − θ| ≤ 2,
[g˜(θ + βu)− g˜(θ)]2 ≤ 2(β
2
L1(g)||u||2)2 + 4βL1(g)||u||2+ 82 + 2β2〈∇g(θ), u〉2 (13)
Take expectation over u, and with Theorem 3 in [24], which is Eu(||g′(θ, u) · u||2) ≤ (d+ 4)||∇g(x)||2,
Eu(||gˆ(θ)||2) ≤ β
2
2
L21(g)Eu(||u||6) + 2Eu(||g′(θ, u) · u||2) + 4β2L1(g)Eu(||u||4) + 82Eu(||u||2)
≤ β
2
2
L21(g)(d+ 6)
3 + 2(d+ 4)||∇g(θ)||2 + 4βL1(g)(d+ 4)2 + 82d.
(14)
With  ∼ O(δ2β), we could bound Eu(||g˜(θ)||2):
Eu(||gˆ(θ)||2) ≤ β
2
2
L21(g)(d+ 6)
3 + 2(d+ 4)||∇g(θ)||2 + 4β2L1(g)(d+ 4)2δ2 + 8β2dδ2. (15)
We use the result that
||∇g(θ)||2 ≤ 2||∇gβ(θ)||2 + β
2
2
L21(g)(d+ 4)
2, (16)
which is proved in [24] Lemma 4.
Therefore, since (n+ 6)3 + 2(n+ 4)3 ≤ 3(n+ 5)3, we could get
Eu(||gˆ(θ)||2) ≤ β
2
2
L21(g)(d+ 6)
3 + 2(d+ 4)||∇g(x)||2 + 2(d+ 4)||∇g(θ)||2
+ 4β2L1(g)(d+ 4)
2δ2 + 8β2dδ2
≤ β
2
2
L21(g)(d+ 6)
3 + 2(d+ 4)(2||∇gβ(x)||2 + β
2
2
L21(g)(d+ 4)
2)
+ 4β2L1(g)(d+ 4)
2δ2 + 8β2dδ2
≤ 4(d+ 4)||∇gβ(x)||2 + 3β
2
2
L21(g)(d+ 5)
3 + 4β2L1(g)(d+ 4)
2δ2 + 8β2dδ2
(17)
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Therefore, since gβ(θ) has Lipshcitz-continuous gradient:
|gβ(θk+1)− gβ(θk) + α〈∇gβ(θk), gˆβ(θk)〉| ≤ 1
2
α2L1(gβ)||gˆβ(θk)||2 (18)
so that
gβ(θk+1) ≤ gβ(θk)− α〈∇gβ(θk), gˆβ(θk)〉+ 1
2
α2L1(gβ)||gˆβ(θk)||2. (19)
Since
Eu(gˆ(θk)) =
1
κ
∫
E
g(θ + βu)− g(θ) + θ+βu − θ
β
ue−
1
2 ||u||2du
= ∇gβ(θk) + 1
κ
∫
E
θ+βu − θ
β
ue−
1
2 ||u||2du
≤ ∇gβ(θk) + 2
β
n1/2 · 1
(20)
where 1 is a all-one vector, taking the expectation in uk, we obtain
Euk(gβ(θk+1)) ≤ gβ(θk)− αk||∇gβ(θk)||2 + αk〈∇gβ(θk),
2
β
n1/2 · 1〉+ 1
2
α2kL1(gβ)Euk ||gˆβ(θk)||2
Euk(gβ(θk+1)) ≤ gβ(θk)− αk||∇gβ(θk)||2 + αk
2
β
n1/2||∇gβ(θk)||
+
1
2
α2kL1(g)(4(d+ 4)||∇gβ(θk)||2 +
3β2
2
L21(g)(d+ 5)
3 + 4β2L1(g)(d+ 4)
2δ2 + 8β2dδ2).
(21)
Choosing αk = αˆ = 14(d+4)L1(f) , we obtain
Euk(gβ(θk + 1)) ≤ gβ(θk)−
1
2
αˆ||∇gβ(θk)||2 + αk 2
β
d1/2||∇gβ(θk)||+ 3β
2
64
L1(g)
(d+ 5)3
(d+ 4)2
+
β2
8
δ2 +
β2d
4(d+ 4)2L1(g)
δ2.
(22)
Since (d+ 5)3 ≤ (d+ 8)(d+ 4)2, taking expectation over Uk, where Uk = {u1, u2, . . . , uk}, we get
φk+1 ≤ φk− 1
2
αˆEUk(||∇gβ(θk)||2)+
3β2(d+ 8)
64
L1(g)+
β2
8
δ2+
β2d
4(d+ 4)2L1(g)
δ2+ αˆd1/2EUk(||∇gβ(θk)||)δ2,
(23)
where φk = EUk−1(g(θk)), k ≥ 1 and φ0 = g(θ0).
Assuming g(x) ≥ g∗, summing over k and divided by N+1, we get
1
N + 1
N∑
k=0
EUk(||∇gβ(θk)||2) ≤ 8(d+ 4)L1(g)[
g(x0)− g∗
N + 1
+
3β2(d+ 8)
16
L1(g) +
β2
8
δ2
+
β2d
4(d+ 4)2L1(g)
δ2 +
1
N + 1
N∑
k=0
EUk(||∇gβ(θk)||)δ2].
(24)
Clearly, 1N+1
N∑
k=0
EUk(||∇gβ(θk)||) ≤ δ2.
Since ϑ2k = EUk(||∇g(θk)||2) ≤ 2EUk(||∇gβ(θk)||2)+β
2(d+4)2
2 L
2
1(g), ϑ
2
k is in the same order oasEUk(||∇gβ(θk)||2).
In order to satisfy 1N+1
N∑
k=0
ϑ2k ≤ δ2, we need to choose β ≤ O( δdL1(g) ), then N is bounded by O( dδ2 ).
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